Probably no central issue of Christian belief depends on the argument. Orthodox Christians could go on believing in the divinity of Jesus even if the argument fails. (On the other hand, if the argument succeeds, those who deny the incarnation at the very least have some explaining to do.) But the frequency with which the argument appears in the popular defences of the divinity of Jesus, as well as its almost total absence from discussions about the status of Jesus by professional theologians and biblical scholars, makes one curious what to make of the argument.
The present paper constitutes a qualified defence of one version of the argument. I will claim that the MBG argument, properly understood, can establish the rationality of belief in the incarnation of Jesus. But a caveat is called for: I do not want to be interpreted as implying that any validation of Jesus' divinity must rest solely on what Jesus himself (explicitly or implicitly) claimed to be. Along with the memory of Jesus' sayings and doings, the post-Easter response to his death and resurrection (as well as the coming of the Holy Spirit) also played a crucial role in forming the early Christians' confession of Jesus as their divine Lord and Son of God. Even if it concentrates on what we know of Jesus' pre-Easter activity, the MBG argument should not be taken to belittle or more extended discussion of the argument, see P. Kreeft, Between Heaven and Hell: A Dialog Somewhere Beyond Death with John F. Kennedy, C. S. Lewis, and Aldous Huxley (Downers Grove, Ill.:InterVarsity Press, 1982). See also J. M. Boice, Foundations of Christian Faith (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 275-7. 6 One such person is John Beversluis, who strongly criticizes C. S. Lewis's version of the MBG argument in C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1985) , 54-7. He calls the argument 'emotionally inflammatory' and claims it is based on a 'fallacious strategy', i.e. a 'false dilemma'. It is 'not a philosophical argument but a psychological spell'. Beversluis is correct that the truth and value of Jesus' moral teachings need not be affected by a judgment that he was mistaken in claiming to be divine; even if he was a lunatic, his moral teachings may still stand. But the major problem with Beversluis's critique is that he does not succeed in explaining how a sane person can be sincerely mistaken in claiming to be God. When Beversluis sets out to explain this point, he inexplicably switches from Jesus' claim to be divine to his claim to be the Messiah. These are two quite different things. Of course, there were sane people in ancient Judaism who mistakenly claimed to be Messiah; indeed, that was almost commonplace. But how can a sane person-especially a 1 st -cent. Jew-mistakenly claim to be divine? 7 I am presupposing here the discussion of the nature of argument, proof, validity, soundness, and success for an argument in my God, Reason, and Theistic Proofs (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1997), 1-14, 188-93. p. 224 ignore the post-Easter developments. I am definitely not suggesting that the MBG argument is the only or even the best argument Christians can give for the divinity of Jesus.
I I
It will facilitate matters if I lay out the argument in what I take to be its logical form:
(1) Jesus claimed, either explicitly or implicitly, to be divine. (2) Jesus was either right or wrong in claiming to be divine. Let me now comment on each premise. Some will require more extended discussion than others.
Premise (1) will turn out to be crucial-indeed, it is probably the crux of the argument-so let us postpone extended comment on it till later. Suffice it for now simply to define its crucial term. Let us say that someone is divine if that person is in some strong sense identical with or equivalent to the omnipotent, omniscient, and loving creator of the heavens and the earth. Now if (1) is true (as I will argue), then premise (2) follows from a substitutioninstance of a well-recognized law of logic, namely, the law of excluded middle. Some philosophers have raised questions about this law (which says that every proposition is either true or, if not true, then false), but it nevertheless seems about as secure as any premise of any argument can be. The vast majority of philosophers will agree that (2) is true. The claim, 'Jesus was correct in claiming to be divine', is either true or, if not true, then false. The MBG argument cannot be successfully challenged here.
But premise (3) can be questioned. Let us say that the statement, 'Jesus was mad', means that he was insane or mentally deluded, just like those confused and frequently institutionalized people today who sincerely believe themselves to be the Virgin Mary or Napoleon.
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Let us say that the statement, 'Jesus was bad', means that he was a liar, or was at least lying about who he was, just like someone today who intentionally deceives people by claiming to be someone else.
Perhaps Jesus claimed to be divine, was neither mad nor bad, but was merely sincerely mistaken about the matter, just as it is possible for a person to be sincerely mistaken about who her true parents are. Now the defender of the MBG argument will surely not want to claim that it is logically or even causally impossible 8 that Jesus was sincerely mistaken in claiming to be divine. If we tried hard enough, we probably could cook up a scenario in which a sane and moral person mistakenly took himself to be divine. But is it probable that Jesus was both sane and sincerely mistaken? Is it probable that (9) Any good person who mistakenly claims to be divine is mad is false? Or is it probable that (10) Any sane person who mistakenly claims to be divine is bad 9 is false?
These are obviously difficult questions. I am inclined to accept both (9) and (10) (and thus (3) as well), but I do not know how to prove them. Certainly a sane and good person could be sincerely mistaken in holding the extremely bizarre belief that she is divine (assuming she uses the word 'divine', as Christians normally do in this context, i.e. as indicating a robust identity with the omnipotent, omniscient, loving creator of the world).
There is something extremely odd about the notion of a sincere, good, and sane person mistakenly claiming to be God. Nor do I consider it possible for an otherwise perfectly sane and good person mistakenly to consider herself to be God. Accordingly, (9) and (10) (and thus (3)), seem to have a high degree of plausibility. I conclude, then, that while (3) may be false, it is most probably true and can stand as a premise in a successful argument.
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One suspects that few will want to dispute (4) and (5). It is possible, however, that someone might want to use them against each other, so to speak, and argue either that:
(11) If Jesus mistakenly claimed to be divine and wasn't mad, then, improbable as it seems, he must have been bad, Or else:
(12) If Jesus mistakenly claimed to be divine and wasn't bad, then, improbable as it seems, he must have been mad. But, again, I believe there is good reason to accept both (4) and (5). Unless most radical of Gospel critics are correct-those who claim we can know virtually nothing about the historical Jesus 10 -there is precious little in the Gospels to suggest that Jesus was either a lunatic or a liar, and much to suggest that he was neither.
Virtually everyone who reads the Gospels-whether committed to Christianity or notcomes away with the conviction that Jesus was a wise and good man. He was loving, compassionate, and caring, hardly the sort who tells lies for self-interested reasons. But Peter Kreeft argues convincingly that Jesus shows none of the character traits usually associated with those who have delusions of grandeur or 'divinity complexes'. Such people are easily recognized by their egotism, narcissism, inflexibility, predictable behaviour, and inability to relate understandingly and lovingly to others. p. 227
seriously entertain the possibility that Jesus was either a lunatic or a liar. When we return below to premise (1) we will have to enter more deeply into the question of the reliability of the New Testament picture of Jesus. Suffice it to say here that there seems every good reason to accept both (4) and (5).
12
Premise (6) is entailed by premises (2), (3), (4), and (5). It is impossible for them to be true and (6) false. Premise (7) is entailed by premises (2) and (6). If they are true, it is true. Finally, step (8), the conclusion of the MBG argument, is entailed by premise (7). If (7) is true, then (8) must be true as well. What we have in the MBG argument, then, is a valid argument. That is, there are no mistakes in logic in the argument; it is logically impossible for its premises (i.e. (1)-(7)) to be true and its conclusion (i.e. step (8)) false.
But is the argument also sound? Let us say that a sound argument is a valid argument whose premises are all true. It appears thus far that while premises (3), (4), and (5) can be criticized, a plausible case can be made for their truth. Clearly the premise that will seem most vulnerable to criticism is premise (1).
Is it true that Jesus claimed, either explicitly or implicitly, to be divine? Before addressing this question directly, it will be helpful to consider the notion of an 'implicit claim', since my argument in the present paper is that Jesus implicitly claimed to be divine. First, what is a 'claim'? Let's say that a claim is an assertion or statement, the kind of linguistic utterance that has a truth value. That is, according to the principle of excluded middle, it is true or, if not true, then false. Now an explicit claim that a proposition p is true would be a statement like 'p is true' or 'Not-p is false'; or 'It is true that p is true' or even simply 'p'.
What then is an implicit claim that p is true? Well, there appear to be several ways of implicitly claiming that p is true. (1) One might implicitly claim that p is true by explicitly asserting that x, y, and z are true, where x, y, and z logically entail p. If one were explicitly assert 'R. E. Lee was a Confederate general' and 'R. E. Lee was a famous general' and 'R. E. Lee was a great general', that could be p. 228 taken as an implicit claim to the effect that 'R. E. Lee was a great and famous Confederate general'. (2) Or one might implicitly claim that p is true by explicitly asserting x, y, and z, where only people who hold that p is true can hold that x, y, and z are true. If one were explicitly to assert that 'R. E. Lee was a great general', that could be taken as an implicit claim to the effect that 'R. E. Lee was a human being'.
13 (3) Most importantly, one might implicitly claim that p is true by doing action A, where the only people, or the only sensible people, who do A are people who believe p. Suppose that Jones, tired and perspiring at the end of a long run, bends over and drinks from a drinking fountain. This might be taken as an implicit claim on Jones's part to the effect that 'The liquid emanating from this drinking fountain is potable'.
We are now able to return to the question whether Jesus implicitly claimed to be divine. This is a good question, to say the least. Much ink has been spilled over it, especially in the past two centuries. (Before that it would have been taken as virtually axiomatic that the answer is yes-indeed, that he explicitly claimed as much.) What is clear, and I think is quite beyond dispute, is that a literalistic and ahistorical reading of the Gospels, and especially the Fourth Gospel, strongly supports premise (1). Notice, for example, the following statements that are attributed to Jesus there (as well as, in some cases, the reactions of those who heard him):
But Jesus answered them, 'My Father is still working, and I also am working.' For this reason the Jews were seeking all the more to kill him, because he was not only breaking the Sabbath, but was also calling God his own Father, thereby making himself equal to God. 13 The difference between (1) and (2) is perhaps not very great. In the case of (2), it is quite possible that the one who is making the implicit claim has never consciously formulated the belief, 'R. E. Lee was a human being', while that seems less probable for the one who is making the implicit claim that 'R. E. Lee was a great and famous Confederate general' in (1). Now there appear to be four main attitudes that might be taken towards claims such as these. First, perhaps Jesus explicitly taught his own divinity, that is, perhaps words such as these constitute the ipsissima verba of Jesus. Second, perhaps Jesus only implicitly taught his own divinity. Third, perhaps Jesus said the things, or some of them, that have been taken to imply his own divinity in John's Gospel and elsewhere, but this is not the proper interpretation of those sayings. Those who defend this option (which corresponds to the third objection to the MBG argument mentioned in Section I) might argue as follows: the words form Jesus like those just cited should be interpreted as indicating something less than robust identity with God; perhaps Jesus was only indicating unity of purpose or will with the Father, or something of that sort. What Jesus really meant, so it might be said, is that he had a very special place in God's redemptive plan, or he had an extraordinarily strong desire to do God's bidding, or he felt such an intimate closeness to God that it was almost as if God were his own father.
14 Fourth, perhaps Jesus said nothing about the matter, and the relevant statements attributed to him in the Gospels are inauthentic; they represent the beliefs not of Jesus but of the Christian church at the time that the Gospels were being written.
In the present chapter, I do not intend to defend the first option, but rather the second; thus I must argue against options three and four.
I I I
As noted in Section I, there appear to be four main criticisms that can be raised against the MBG argument. First, it presupposes that we know what it is like to be God. Second, it presupposes a naïve world-view, one that allows for special divine acts in history. Third (the same point as the third option just discussed), it misinterprets 14 This is certainly the route that must be taken by all those who, like Jehovah's Witnesses, claim to accept the full theological authority of the Bible but reject the idea that Jesus was God incarnate.
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what Jesus meant by the statements about himself that we find in the Gospels. Fourth, it presupposes a precritical view of the Gospels (and especially John), one that views them (and it) as straightforward history. Let us consider these objections in turn. (When we get to the fourth objection, we will also be replying to the fourth option noted at the end of Section III---that the high Christological statements attributed to Jesus in the Gospels are authentic.)
As to the first criticism, it is not easy to understand precisely what MacKinnon had in mind. What he said was that the MBG argument presupposes that we know what it is like to be God. Of course it is true that we do not know what it is like to be God. But it is hard to grasp exactly why the MBG arguer must presuppose that we have that knowledge. Let's make a distinction between knowing what it is like to be God and knowing what God is like. It is surely true that it would border on blasphemy for those who use the MBG argument-or anybody else, for that matter-to presuppose that they know what it is like to be God. In the fullest sense, we don't even know what it is like to be another human being, or what it is like to be a bat. 15 But is it possible for human beings to know what God is like? The answer to this, at least from a Christian perspective, is surely yes. One of the defining ideas of the Christian faith (as well as other versions of theism) is that God has been revealed. God 16 and there seems to be nothing blasphemous or otherwise theologically untoward here. For the MBG argument to 15 See Thomas Nagel's article, 'What is it Like to Be a Bat?', in Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett (eds.), The Mind's I, (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1981), 391-403. 16 To avoid any hint of circularity (since Christians claim that the fullest revelation of God's nature is Christ), we could even limit our knowledge of God to what can be known about God apart from Christ. We could limit ourselves to what has been revealed about God in the natural order, or in the OT Law, or in the words of the prophets.
p. 231 work, our knowledge of God need not be comprehensive; we need to know only a little about God. So the partialness of our knowledge of God need not constitute a problem for the MBG argument.
As to the second criticism, Hick argues that the MBG argument presupposes a precritical world view, one in which special divine acts in human history are allowable. But there is something slightly off-target about this criticism: Hick's objection appears to be directed more against the idea of incarnation as such than against the MBG argument in favour of the incarnation. Hick is right that the very idea of incarnation-of God becoming a human being-presupposes divine interventions in human history. This is why Deists must deny not only all miracles, epiphanies, visions from God, and prophetic messages from God, but all incarnations as well.
And it is true that if the very idea of incarnation is discredited, then the MBG argument can hardly constitute a successful argument in favour of incarnation. Still, since Hick's criticism is not directed against the MBG argument per se, and especially since many contemporary Christian philosophers have defended the adequacy of theism versus Deism (i.e. of the possibility of special divine acts), 17 I will discuss this matter no further here. (An atheist could similarly argue that belief in incarnation is irrational because belief in God is outmoded, but again that would not count as an objection to the MBG argument itself.)
As to the third objection, the violent reactions of Jesus' enemies in texts cited (and in many other texts where Jesus speaks about himself, some from the Synoptics) seem to preclude any such minimalist interpretation as, 'Jesus just meant that he felt extraordinarily close to God'. As well as the reactions in the above citations, note the argument of the chief priests at John's trial account: 'We have a law, and according to that law he ought to die because he has claimed to be the Son of God' (John 19:7). It would hardly have constituted an offence worthy of arrest and execution had Jesus simply been declaring his own unity of purpose or will with the Father, or claiming to have a special place in God's plan. Odd, maybe; egotistical, maybe; but hardly blasphemous. Notice further that Jesus did not step in to correct the impression his enemies apparently gained from hearing his words.
As noted earlier, the fourth criticism-that the MBG argument presupposes a precritical view of the Gospels and especially John as straightforward history-is the really important one. This criticism amounts to a denial of premise (1) of the MBG argument. Is premise (1) true?
It is a commonplace of much contemporary New Testament scholarship that words such as those cited above from the Fourth Gospel do not constitute the ipsissima verba of Jesus. These statements, it is said, and the many other statements in the New Testament that imply or seem to imply the divinity of Jesus, tell us more about the faith of the early church at the time the Gospels were being written or were receiving final form than they do about the actual teachings of Jesus. Later Christians wrongly attributed these words to Jesus as part of their theological programme. Thus-so a critic of the MBG argument will argue-the MBG argument for the incarnation cannot even get going. Its first premise is false; Jesus never claimed-explicitly or implicitly-to be divine.
I V
Is this a good objection? Well, there is much in the neighborhood that is beyond reproach. It is true that the Gospels are statements of faith with definite theological agendas rather than 'facts-only' biographies of Jesus. (The writer of John even admits as much-see John 20:31.) It is also almost certainly true that John's Gospel was the last canonical gospel written, and thus the furthest removed from the events it records. But it is a long way from these sensible admissions about the Gospels to the point that none of the sayings of Jesus that imply or seem to imply his own divinity can be authentic. Let us see what can be said on behalf of the historical reliability of some of the statements Jesus makes about himself in the Gospel, especially in the Synoptics. I will not presuppose the view that the evangelists were offering straightforward, theologically neutral history. Moreover, I take it as given that the church translated, edited, rearranged, recontextualised, paraphrased, abbreviated, and expanded the sayings of Jesus. Furthermore, since the NT was written in Greek, then assuming that Jesus spoke and taught in p. 233
Aramaic, precisely none of the sayings attributed to Jesus in the Gospels constitute his ipsissima verba (except possibly those few sayings that are cited in Aramaic).
Again, premise (1) of the MBG argument says:
(1) Jesus claimed, either explicitly or implicitly, to be divine. My claim is that by his words and deeds, Jesus implicitly saw or experienced himself as divine, as having a unique relationship of divine sonship to God. This does not necessarily mean that Jesus, throughout his life or even throughout his ministry, ever formulated or expressed the idea precisely in language, although I hold that at some point he was able to do so. I suspect his sense of mission and identity was shaped and confirmed by various crucial events during his ministry, for example, the baptism, temptation, transfiguration, and passion. It is possible to have a vague and inchoate awareness of something that one is able only later to capture in words. So the question, 'Did Jesus know that he was God?' is ill-formed. Jesus surely did not confuse himself with God the Father to whom he prayed. But did he implicitly claim to be divine or to have divine prerogatives? Did he implicitly claim to have a unique relationship to the Father which in effect placed him on a par with God? I believe the answer to these questions is yes. (Again, my argument will not presuppose a naïve and ahistorical reading of the Gospels.)
How do we go about deciding what someone believes or implicitly claims? Well, the most obvious way to find out whether Jones believes p is to ask her or wait till she expresses some sort of epistemic attitude toward p (assertion, denial, certainty, doubt, uncertainty, etc.). And in cases where there is no good reason to doubt Jones's word, this will normally be convincing evidence. In other cases, we might have to listen to other things that Jones says or watch things that she does in order to see if any of them constitute convincing evidence that Jones implicitly claims that p (or not-p) is true. It is possible, as noted above, for a person to believe that p is true without ever having formulated 'p' as a conscious belief. There are probably people who walk to work every day who believe, without ever having consciously formulated the belief, that 'the pavement will hold me up'. I am going to present my argument in two stages. The first will presuppose the basic correctness of the methods and conclusions of some of the most radical of biblical critics. 19 Its aim is to open the door to the possibility of showing, even on the methods of people like Bultmann, Perrin, and the members of the Jesus Seminar, that Jesus implicitly taught his own divinity. The second stage (which contains five sub-arguments) will try to confirm the point that Jesus actually did this very thing. At this second stage, I will continue to eschew any naïve or ahistorical view of the Gospels, but will no longer consider myself limited by the views of the radical critics.
In the first stage of my argument, I want simply (1) to point out a fact about early Christian history that is becoming clearer and clearer, even if radical methods of criticism are employed, namely, that worship of Jesus was a very ancient phenomenon in the Christian community; and (2) to ask why this fact is so. As to the fact that worship of Jesus was primitive in the Christian community, Richard Bauckham ways: 'The prevalence and centrality of the worship of Jesus in early Christianity from an early date has frequently been underestimated….In the earliest Christian community Jesus was already understood to be risen and exalted to God's right hand in heaven, active in the community by his Spirit, and coming in the future as ruler and judge of the world.' 
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Notice that prayers addressed to Jesus can be found from the earliest times. It is significant that Greek-speaking churches preserved in Aramaic the cry Maranatha ('Our Lord, come!') (1 Cor. 16:22; Didache 10:6); this shows its primitive origin. Personal prayers to Jesus seem to have been commonplace (2 Cor. 12:8; 1 Thess. 3:11-13; 2 Thess. 2:16-17; 3:5, 16; Acts 1:24; 7:59-60). There were also doxologies addressed to Christ, or to Christ and the Father together, although most appear in relatively late NT texts (2 Tim. 4:18; 2 Pet. 3:18; Rev. 1:5-6, 13; cf. 7:10). In earlier texts, doxologies with the phrase 'through Jesus Christ' appear (Rom. 16:27; cf. 2 Cor. 1:20). Hymns of praise to Christ were also common (Phil. 2:6-11; 1 Tim. 3:16; cf. Eph. 5:19; Col. 3:16).
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In a recent paper, L. W. Hurtado argues that a careful reading of Matthew and Mark reveals that there was a vigorous Jewish opposition in the pre-70 period to JewishChristian worship of Jesus. 22 Bauckham claims that the transition from prayers to Jesus, thanksgiving to Jesus, and reverence for Jesus to actual worship of Jesus (cf. Acts 13:2) was a smooth and perhaps not even conscious process; there is no evidence, he says, of anybody in the earliest Christian community contesting it. He concludes that 'the role which Jesus played in the Christian religion from the beginning was such as to cause him to be treated as God in worship'.
23
All this despite the fact that the earliest Christians were Jews, people whose rigid monotheism and antipathy to worship of any other gods besides the Lord was perhaps their defining religious characteristic. Indeed, the New Testament church did not see itself as backing away from monotheism; in 1 Corinthians 8:4-6 Paul accepts the classic Shema of Judaism (Deut. 6:4), but he interprets the monotheism of the Christian community as including the lordship of Jesus. And in the Book of Revelation, Jesus is considered worthy of divine worship because worship of Jesus can be included in worship of the one God (Rev. 5:8-12). Worship of Jesus was worship of (not a competitor of God but) God. 21 The hymn from Phil. 2, in particular, witnesses to the way in which early Christians viewed the crucified and exalted Jesus as meriting the adoration of the universe. In The Changing Faces of Jesus (London: Penguin, 2000), Geza Vermes has recently suggested that a later, anonymous copyist inserted this hymn into the text of the letter (pp. 78-79)-a proposal which enjoys no support from the New Testament MS evidence. 22 Hurtado, 'Pre-70 C.E. Jewish Opposition', 5-6, 10. 23 'Jesus, Worship of', 815.
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Next, a question: if Bauckham is correct that worship of Jesus was primitive in the Christian community, why is this the case? There appear to be two main possibilities. First, perhaps the early church worshipped Jesus because social, economic, liturgical, polemical, or other sorts of needs and pressures that the early Christians faced pushed them in that direction. That is, the early church made up the idea that Jesus was divine. Second, perhaps they worshipped Jesus at least in part because Jesus himself implicitly encouraged, instructed, or allowed them to do so. 24 That is, Jesus himself was conscious of being divine and implicitly communicated that fact, by his words and deeds, to his followers.
Interestingly, the Synoptic Gospels, and especially Matthew, opt for the second alternative. That does not settle the case, because for now we are accepting the methodology and conclusions of some of the radical critics, and many of them regard Matthew's Gospel as an unreliable guide to the life of Jesus. Still, Matthew commonly uses one or another form of the word proskynesis (obeisance, prostration before someone in worship) in relation to Jesus. Jesus is worshipped by the wise men from the East (2:2, 11), by the disciples in the boat (14:33), by Mary Magdalene and the other Mary after the resurrection (28:9), and by the eleven disciples on the mountain (28:17). Bauckham argues that 'Matthew's consistent use of the word proskynein and his emphasis on the point show that he intends a kind of reverence which, paid to any other human, he would have regarded as idolatrous'.
25
Let's now look at a few Synoptic texts that are accepted as authentic by people like Bultmann, Perrin, and members of the Jesus Seminar. Even in limiting ourselves in that way, I believe a probable case can be made that Jesus implicitly taught his own divinity.
But if it is by the finger of God that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come to you. This text, which Perrin accepts as authentic 27 and which the Jesus Seminar rates pink ('Jesus probably said something like this' 28 ), is remarkable in the authority that Jesus is taking upon himself to relativize and de-emphasize Jewish dietary law. Jesus is in effect abolishing the divinely given food laws, that is, he is dismantling one of the major barriers between Jews and Gentiles that God was understood to have erected. Jesus is saying that in the light of his own presence in the world, a radically new attitude toward religion is required. Along the same lines, notice this statement (again coloured pink by the Jesus Seminar):
The Sabbath was made for humankind, and not humankind for the Sabbath; so the Son of Man is Lord even of the Sabbath. 
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Tobit 4:3); this duty took precedence over the study of Torah, Temple service, circumcision rites, and even reciting the Shema (Megillah, 3b; Berakath 3:1). Accordingly, Jesus was declaring that the need for people immediately and unconditionally to become his disciples took precedence even over the solemn responsibility to bury one's own father.
It would be helpful to ask at this point what sort of first-century Jew would take upon himself the authority to set aside requirements of the Mosaic law and replace them with his own teachings? It seems that Jesus' view of his own authority was such that he took the duty to follow him as a far more urgent task than burying one's father. Gruenler pointedly asks, 'Who could possibly make such an offensive and insensitive statement except one who is absolutely convinced that following him is worth more than anything else in the world?' 29 In other words, it is probable that Jesus considered himself to be divinely authoritative.
Notice also the new attitude toward enemies, sins, and the forgiveness of sins that Jesus introduced. (I am not here speaking of Jesus' taking upon himself the authority to forgive sins; we shall discuss that point later.) Most famously, note:
You have heard that it was said, 'you shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' But I say to you, 'Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you'. (Matt. 5:43-4; par. Luke 6:27, 35)
The 'love your enemies' piece of this text is coloured red by the Jesus Seminar; they are suspicious of the rest of it (it is either black or gray); but Perrin accepts the whole antithesis as authentic. The point is that those who were once considered unforgivable enemies (Gentiles, outcasts, sinners, etc.) are now, in the light of the inbreaking of the Kingdom of God in Jesus, seen as recipients of God's love and forgiveness, and as worthy participants in table-fellowship in the kingdom of God. Jesus is again apparently taking upon himself the authority to reorder religious life, in this case around the principles of love and forgiveness. We see this same point more fully and dramatically in the parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11-32; coloured pink by the Jesus Seminar). Gruenler comments: 'Only one who is conscious of exercising divine privileges (or is mad) could assume the right to proclaim the eschatological presence of the forgiveness of sins with such authority…. [Jesus] 29 New Approaches to Jesus and the Gospels, 61.
p. 239 is consciously speaking as the voice of God on matters that belong only to God, and accordingly is creating a new and decisive Christology which far exceeds in claim to authority the messianic models of Judaism.' 30 Jesus' idea seems to have been that salvation has arrived in his own person and ministry, that salvation for humans is to be understood in terms of his own person and mission, and that he can speak with divine authority. Jesus had an extraordinarily high opinion of himself and his mission.
Notice finally the parable of the wicked tenants in Mark 12:1-9 (coloured gray by the Jesus Seminar but pink in the Gospel of Thomas (65:1-7)). 31 The owner of the vineyard unsuccessfully sends two employees to collect the harvest, and then finally sends his son, whom the tenants recognize as the son and heir, and then murder him. Clearly, the son in the parable allegorically stands for Jesus himself, who is different from and superior to God's previous emissaries (the prophets), and who is indeed God's son and heir. Now I am not claiming that Bultmann, Perrin, Funk, Crossan, et al. accept my interpretations of these texts. Doubtless they do not. My claim is simply that they consider these statements from Jesus to be authentic or probably authentic, and that from these texts alone a very high Christology can be inferred. 32 That is, a probable case can be made that Jesus implicitly taught his own divinity. Perhaps then one reason for the existence of worship of Jesus in the primitive Christian community is that Jesus himself expected and accepted it.
30 Ibid. 46. 31 As they themselves admit in their commentary on this text, the members of the Seminar were bothered by the allegorical aspect of the parable in its Synoptic versions, with its obvious application to Jesus (= the son) himself. Funk et al. Five Gospels, 101.
32 Beyond question, the interpretation of all these texts, especially those that bear on the Jewish law, is controversial. Vermes for example interprets the sayings about the Sabbath, the dietary laws, and the antitheses ('but I say to you…') as entailing no high claims for Jesus' personal identity; they are, he says, the kinds of statements that could have been made by Jewish teachers of his time (Changing Faces of Jesus, 196-7). Yet some of the evidence to which Vermes points comes from rabbis who lived on or two centuries later. Besides, the more one portrays Jesus as religiously 'normal' and not scandalously offensive, the more puzzling becomes the opposition that led to his crucifixion. The present chapter attempts to sketch the various steps in the MBG argument. For a full discussion of the key texts about Jesus and the Jewish law, see the work of such scholars as J. D. G. Dunn, E. P. Sanders, and the earlier Vermes, as well as the data supplied by commentaries on Matthew, Mark, and Luke from such writers as J. A. Fitzmeyer, R. A. Guelich, D. Hagner, and J. Nolland.
